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Abstract 
It has been argued in various places that measurement-induced collapses in Orthodox 
Quantum Mechanics yields a genuine structural (or intrinsic) quantum arrow of time. In this 
paper, I will critically assess this proposal. I begin by distinguishing between a structural and 
a non-structural arrow of time. After presenting the proposal of a collapse-based arrow of time 
in some detail and discussing some criticisms it has faced, I argue, first, that any quantum 
arrow of time in Orthodox Quantum Mechanics cannot be defined for the entire universe and, 
second, that it requires non-dynamical information to be established. Consequently, I deliver 
that any quantum arrow of time in Orthodox Quantum Mechanics is, at best, local and non-
structural, deflating the original proposal. 
Keywords: Arrow of time – Quantum Mechanics – Collapse – Measurement 
1. Introduction 
Whether non-relativistic quantum mechanics (QM henceforth) exhibits an arrow of time has been 
to a great extent an interpretation-dependent matter. The problem has largely depended upon which 
the dynamics of QM is and whether it is time-reversal symmetric or not. On the one hand, it has 
been widely accepted that, as long as quantum systems evolve unitarily according to a free 
Schrödinger-type equation, QM is time-reversal symmetric, and thereby, it exhibits no arrow of 
time, at least structurally. On the other, it has been argued that some interpretations of QM 
introduce some time-reversal asymmetric elements in the dynamics that render QM time-reversal 
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asymmetric, which reflects a structural preference for one of time’s directions. Whereas bare QM, 
Wave-Function Realism, Everett’s relative-state and Many-World interpretation would fall into 
the former side, the so-called collapse theories would definitively fall into the latter. So, defenders 
of an in-built arrow of time in QM have seen in collapse theories of either version a fertile terrain 
for upholding a quantum arrow of time.  
From a very broad viewpoint, collapse theories basically consist in introducing a non-linear 
and stochastic dynamics in the quantum formalism, so that the quantum systems evolves generally 
according to some Schrödinger-type equation, but under some circumstances, they undergo a “hit” 
or “jump” that collapses their quantum states (or that “reduces” their wavefunctions) onto an 
eigenstate of some observable. The introduction of these “jumps” intends to account for the 
classical behavior of macroscopic systems by modifying the unitary dynamics of QM. Though the 
idea of “reduction” and “stochasticity” pervade any collapse-type theory, specific versions diverge 
over how collapses are brought about, and under which circumstances they are brought about. The 
first proponents of a collapse-type theory held that collapses were brought about any time a 
measurement is performed. These measurement-induced collapses (MIC) basically compose the 
so-called “Collapse Postulate”, or “Projection Postulate” (PP henceforth). This view became a sort 
of orthodoxy in the physicists’ community up to our days and is one of the dynamical principles 
(or axiom) of the Orthodox Quantum Mechanics (OQM) along with the Schrödinger equation. 
Yet, in the 70s, a new family of collapse theories was born –the Dynamical Reduction Program 
(DRP). Aiming at overcoming many of MIC’s issues, while retaining some of its essential features, 
its defenders developed a collapse theory on the basis of a single dynamics, where those “jumps” 
were brought about spontaneously, independently of any measurement procedure. Both MIC and 
DRP introduces a dynamical mechanism that would not only guarantee that measurements will 
always have outcome, but also would break the time-reversal symmetry of the theory –quantum 
systems collapse, but they do not uncollapse.  
This paper will focus on OQM and, particularly, on MIC. Several physicists and philosophers 
have suggested that MIC lays the groundwork for a quantum arrow of time –since MIC is an axiom 
of OQM, and MIC turns out time-reversal asymmetric, OQM exhibits an in-built arrow of time 
Setting aside the numerous interpretative issues OQM has had to face, the idea is persuasive and 
has received considerable support in the physicists’ community as well as in the philosophers’. 
However, it has not been fully clear what is the scope, and what are the details of such a claim. 
3 
 
Some philosophers have distinguished between a fundamental (or structural) and a non-
fundamental (or emergent) arrows of time. Others have drawn the distinction between local and 
global, or between objective and non-objective arrows of time. Under the assumption that OQM 
is a tenable interpretation of QM, what sort of quantum arrow of time MIC yields? How does it 
come to establish a genuine time-reversal asymmetry, if it is really so?  
In this paper, I will assess MIC in relation to its time-asymmetric nature and the resultant arrow 
of time. In the first place, I will analyze and discuss opposing positions with respect to whether 
MIC yields a genuine time-reversal asymmetry and, consequently, a quantum arrow of time. Then, 
I will argue that the sort of time-reversal asymmetry that MIC provides us just yields a local, non-
structural arrow of time, which largely relies on non-dynamical information about the quantum 
state. The structure of the paper is as follows. In Section 1, the theoretical basis of MIC and OQM 
will be briefly presented. In Section 2, the distinction between a fundamental and a non-
fundamental arrow of time will be introduced along with the relationships between MIC and a 
quantum arrow of time according to its main defenders. In Section 3, some criticisms against a 
quantum arrow of time induced by MIC will be discussed. In Section 4, my main arguments will 
be laid out. I will first show why MIC’s arrow of time is, at best, non-structural. Then, I will show 
why it is categorically local. Finally, some concluding remarks and guidelines for future work. 
2. Quantum Evolution and Measurements: OQM 
The origin of OQM, and of MIC in particular in the 30s, is some primitive form of the so-called 
measurement problem. The literature on this is abundant, so I will not get into details here (see 
Albert 1992, Maudlin 1995, Wallace 2007). In a nutshell, the measurement problem can be posed 
in the following plain way: QM involves an intrinsic paradox that seems to be unsurmountable 
from QM’s means alone, namely, that what QM’s dynamics (i.e. a Schrödinger-type dynamics) 
predicts is flagrantly in contradiction with what we observe in experiments. So, it seems that the 
theory is in need of further revisions to escape the paradox. Otherwise, QM’s dynamics yields 
wrong predictions. OQM was one of the first attempts to overcome this setback in the development 
of the new quantum theory –the bare QM was in need of an additional postulate, MIC, that 
accounted for what was macroscopically observed in experiments. 
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In essence, MIC prescribes that quantum systems undergo a radically different evolution when 
measured. Hence, OQM prescribes a two-fold dynamic for quantum systems: either they evolve 
unitarily according to some Schrödinger-type equation when no measured, or they experience a 
“jump” or “collapse” caused by a measurement process. In 1930, Paul Dirac presented MIC to 
bridge the gap between QM’s dynamics and experiments: 
“When we measure a real dynamical variable ξ, the disturbance involved in the act 
of measurement causes a jump in the state of the dynamical system (…). In this 
way we see that a measurement always causes the system to jump into an eigenstate 
of the dynamical variable that is being measured, the eigenvalue this eigenstate 
belongs to being equal to the result of the measurement”. (Dirac 1935: 36) 
Few years after, John von Neumann (1955[1932]) proposed a model for (ideal) measurements 
that has become canonical in the field, giving a more refined version of MIC. Von Neumann’s 
main statement of MIC comes in the following way: 
“we have therefore two fundamentally different types of interventions which can 
occur in a system S (…) first, the arbitrary changes by measurements (…). Second, 
the automatic changes which occur with the passage of time”. (von Neumann 1955: 
351. Emphasis added) 
Both sorts of interventions (or processes as he has also called them) are of a fundamentally 
different nature: while the first is statistical, the second is causal. In analyzing in detail these two 
types of processes, von Neumann claims: 
“Why then do we need the special process 1 for the measurement? The reason is 
this: In the measurement we cannot observe the system S by itself, but must instead 
investigate the system S+M, in order to obtain (numerically) its interaction with the 
measuring apparatus M. The theory of the measurement is a statement concerning 
S+M, and should describe how the state of S is related to certain properties of the 
state of M”. (Ibidem: 352) 
Dirac’s and von Neumann’s introduction of MIC would give birth to the dynamical core of 
OQM by introducing a postulate ruling a radically different sort of evolution for the quantum state 
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when a measurement process takes place. This reveals that quantum mechanics is somehow a 
twofaced theory, which manifests in the fact that the bare QM solely involves a unitary, 
deterministic, smooth and linear evolution given by a Schrödinger-type equation, whereas OQM 
adds a non-unitary, purely probabilistic, sharp and non-liner evolution given by a particular 
physical process that collapses the quantum state into an eigenstates of some observable. Let’s put 
all this more formally. 
Suppose an electron entering a z-device that measures z-spin’s electron. According to QM, 
once the electron is correlated with the z-device, what we ended up with is a chain of superpositions 
like 
 




𝐷 + |↓⟩𝑧|"𝑧 𝑑𝑜𝑤𝑛"⟩
𝐷)       (1) 
What Dirac’s and von Neumann’s postulate tells us is that, during a z-spin measurements, the 
quantum state in eq. 1 abruptly and suddenly collapses with a fifteen percent of chances into either 
|↑⟩𝑧|"𝑧 𝑢𝑝"⟩
𝐷 or |↓⟩𝑧|"𝑧 𝑑𝑜𝑤𝑛"⟩
𝐷. Otherwise state, the quantum state “jumps”1 into one of its 
eigenstates, undergoing a radically different sort of evolution –a non-unitary, non-deterministic 
and non-linear one. In this way, we obtain an explanation of why we observe what we actually 
observe after measurements.  
From above, it is evident that in OQM measurements play a crucial role in detailing the 
quantum evolution. After all quantum-mechanical results and predictions are about quantum 
systems and measurement devices (as von Neumann stresses). So, even though the Schrödinger 
equation correctly describes the evolution of any quantum state in isolation, this is unimportant 
(von Neumann 1955: 357) from the quantum mechanics’ complete viewpoint: the theory, as long 
as it involves measurements, must also provide some explanations of why if a quantum state was 
 
1 The “jumps” or “state-vector collapses” have been understood in different ways. Physicists like John von 
Neumann and Eugene Wigner thought that collapses were physically real processes that occurred under the 
presence of an observer’s counciousnes (von Neumann 1955) and, as in the case of Wigner, at the level of 
counciousnes (Wigner 1967: 171). This view was not completely shared by Heisenberg, who believed that 
humans were not necessary involved in the measurement process. It rather involves, essentially, an 




evolving in a superposition of states, it suddenly and rapidly collapses into one of its eigenstates 
when measured. MIC is supposed to explain it by extending the list of axioms (or postulates) of 
QM. 
When it comes to specify OQM conceptually, some problems arise as the interpretation was 
supported by a huge variety of physicists and philosophers holding quite divergent principles and 
philosophies. For instance, OQM has been typically bound to the so-called Copenhagen 
Interpretation. But this relation was never entirely clear: There is no single clear statement of what 
the Copenhagen interpretation is, so it is not an easy task to clearly single its main tenets out. An 
explanation for this is that the interpretation has involved many philosophers and physicists 
endorsing unalike ideas, so that it ends up being an amalgam of unclear and loosely related tenets. 
Furthermore, the interpretation is frequently associated with Niels Bohr’s own ideas (its first and 
main defender), though it is not at all clear either what Bohr’s ideas exactly were. For instance, 
Bohr never talked about “the collapse of the wave function” (if the wave-function is not real for 
him, how could it collapse?), whereas Heisenberg did. Notwithstanding, OQM’s and 
Copenhagen’s seem to have in general followed Heisenberg’s ideas on this, rather Bohr’s. 
Yet, despite these unclarities and interpretational issues, there are at least some central tenets 
endorsed by virtually any OQM’s supporters (including Copenhagen’s). All this has been largely 
discussed in the literature and a careful analysis of these issues would take us far beyond the scopes 
of this paper (see Cushing 1994, Brock 2003, Aaserud and Heilbron 2013, and Faye 1991, 2014 
for details). But it is worth mentioning, and emphasizing, two ideas that have pervaded OQM and 
have a “Copenhagen air”:  
• the inner nature of the quantum realm remains veiled to what we are able to know and 
communicate: the quantum theory can only be about measurement outcomes (see, for 
instance, Bohr 1935: 1025, Zeilinger 2005: 743). 
• Any meaningful sense of reality (and thus of ontology) can only concern what is knowable 
by (classical) experiments and communicated by our (classical) language. This likely just 
expresses a pragmatic Kantian stance sponsored by Bohr (Brock 2003, Faye 2014), though 
it has been often interpreted as a manifested instrumentalist (or anti-realist) posture with 
respect to quantum theory (mainly to the wave-function). 
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For my concerns in this paper, these tenets point to one clear direction: whatever an arrow of time 
comes to be within OQM, measurements (and the type of evolution they rule) will play a 
paramount role, both theoretically and conceptually. 
3. Measurement-Induced Collapses and the Arrow of Time 
By assuming OQM, the question of whether QM exhibits a time’s direction becomes whether 
OQM does it. And this implies to evaluate whether OQM involves some time asymmetric element 
among its tenets that lay the foundations for an arrow of time. As I mentioned above, it has been 
argued that OQM effectively provides us with the required elements to stablish a quantum arrow 
of time. This claim has come up in various places (it appears, for instance, in Aharanov’s critic 
1964 paper as an already widely-extended belief. See also, for instance, Popper 1982, Penrose 
1989, Price 1996, Arntzenius 1997, Lucas 1999, Healey 2002, Atkinson 2006, Ellis 2013, 
Callender 2018: 94 and references therein). For instance, Frank Arntzenius (1997) has defended 
that collapse theories introduce an arrow of time since  
“such theories say that are invariant forward transition chances for each of the 
possible initial quantum state to the possible collapsed states after the interaction 
(…). One cannot add some set of invariant backward transition chances to such 
theories, while retaining an empirically adequate theory, since the backward 
transition frequencies in the phenomena are highly non-invariant when one varies 
the frequencies with which the photons are emitted from the possible sources (1997: 
S218) 
For David Atkinson, the time asymmetry in OQM (in a more Copenhagen guise) comes actually 
from ‘observation’ (Atkinson 2006: 540). In any case, a collapse-induced time asymmetry has 
been probably popularized within the philosophy of physics field by Roger Penrose (1989) and a 
quite simple thought experiment. This is a good starting point to assess the proposal, but, before 
getting into it, I will briefly distinguish two senses in which we can speak of an arrow of time –a 
structural and a non-structural sense. 
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3.1. Structural and non-structural arrows of time. 
One of the main issues concerning the metaphysics of time involves the origin and nature of the 
distinction between the past-to-future and the future-to-past direction. Such a distinction has been 
usually referred to as “arrows of time”. Many arrows of time can be found in physics as the 
pervasive increase of entropy, phenomena involving radiation, various decay processes, and so 
forth. The existence of such arrows is out of any doubt. The philosophical problem, though, is 
twofold. First, what is the relation among different arrows of time? Second, is there a fundamental 
or structural arrow of time? I will focus my attention to this latter question. 
Though the existence of various arrows of time in physics is recognized, it is also claimed that 
none of them can be considered as structural. The reasons for this are multiple, but they overall 
boil down to the fact the fundamental dynamical equations of our best physical theories (i.e. those 
equation describing free systems under the influence of no force or of a constant field) are time-
reversal symmetric. This means that they remain invariant under the action of reversing the 
direction of time in them. In this sense, it is said that the wide panoply of temporally asymmetric 
phenomena we find in nature somehow emerge from such a directionless fundamental level. A 
clear instance of this is the case of thermodynamic processes and their underlying classical-
mechanical basis –even though entropy irremediably increases in isolated thermodynamics 
systems towards the future, the underlying mechanics remains invariant under the inversion of the 
direction of time. Therefore, the temporal asymmetry at the thermodynamics level remains at some 
degree unexplained by the mechanical basis. The same issue replicates across different theories. 
In virtue of this, it has been considered that the problem of the arrow of time in physics is to provide 
an explanation of how temporally asymmetric phenomena can emerge from a temporal symmetric 
dynamic (i.e., from time-reversal symmetric dynamical laws). 
It is however useful to properly qualify the different arrows of time. There seems to be a sense 
conforming to which an arrow of time can be more fundamental (or structural) than others. Paul 
Horwich, for instance, claims that such an arrow of time would be given by intrinsic properties of 
a theory’s dynamics, which he relates to its capacity to remain invariant under time reversal. The 
idea is that a structural arrow of time is built in a theory’s dynamics, in the sense that a it is the 
very dynamics which exhibits an asymmetry of time itself and it does not depend on any external 
property or element. In this sense, the arrow of time is intrinsic to the dynamics, since its time-
reversal asymmetry is a property thereof. The argument probably relies on the relation between a 
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dynamic’s theory and its underlying space-time geometry –if a theory’s dynamics is time-reversal 
symmetric, it would reveal an intrinsic asymmetry in the structure of the space-time posed by the 
theory (see, for instance, North 2008). In general, defenders of non-reductionist accounts of the 
arrow of time have defended that a structural arrow of time, if it exists, it will be given by an 
intrinsic property of the space-time (see Earman 1974, Maudlin 2002), or a theory’s dynamics 
(Horwich 1987). Time-reversal (a)symmetry will simply make such a feature dynamically evident. 
Notwithstanding, reductionist accounts of the arrow of time have greatly assumed that the 
existence of time-reversal symmetric dynamical equations play some role in our understanding of 
time’s direction in physics, but in a different sense –they hamper a structural arrow of time. In 
general, those views have explained the arrows of time in terms of properties or elements external 
to the dynamics. The paradigmatic case is the relying on special initial conditions –even though a 
theory’s dynamics is invariant under time reversal (meaning that there seems not to involve a 
structural distinction between time’s directions), temporal asymmetries emerge from special initial 
conditions, for instance, an incredibly low entropy initial state. This sense of arrow of time seems 
to be more circumscribed in many senses, but it is clear that it does not come out solely from the 
dynamic, but it needs to be imposed through external properties or elements. 
A deeper analysis of the grounds for such distinction will surely require further argumentation. 
But it is enough for the purposes of this paper to leave clear that there seems to be a distinction 
between a structural arrow of time and non-structural (or emergent) arrows of time. I think the 
difference can be unfolded in different ways, but it crucially hinges upon which resources a 
theory’s dynamics has to draw the distinction between the past-to-future and the future-to-past 
directions. An easy way to see all this is through the models of a theory and in which sense they 
are time-reversal symmetric. 
Suppose a physical theory 𝑇, whose models can be portioned in two classes: those with 𝑡 
increasing (𝑊𝑓) and those with 𝑡 decreasing (𝑊𝑏). So, 𝑊𝑓 will include all those evolutions going 
in the forward direction of time, and 𝑊𝑏 those going backward. If a theory’s dynamics is time-
reversal symmetric, then it will produce a pair of time-symmetric twins as models, that is, 𝑊𝑓 and 
𝑊𝑏. Furthermore, a mapping between models can be easily implemented. But, if a theory’s 
dynamics turns out asymmetric under time reversal, then its dynamics will only generate either 
𝑊𝑓-type models or 𝑊𝑏-type ones. So, intrinsic properties of a theory’s dynamics (in Horwich’s 
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sense) rules out a complete class of possible evolutions. The situation is quite different for non-
structural or emergent arrows of time. To begin, we are dealing with a theory’s dynamics that 
generates both 𝑊𝑓-type and 𝑊𝑏-type models. In this sense, there is no (structural) arrow of time. 
However, a singular model can exhibit an asymmetry with respect to some element in it. For 
instance, the initial conditions of a particular model are so special that generate an (non-structural 
or emergent) arrow of time, which is only valid within such a model. Such an arrow of time thus 
depends on the special properties of the model, which are external to the theory’s dynamics. 
To sum up. In the rest of the sections, I will refer to a structural or non-structural arrow of time 
in the aforementioned sense. A structural arrow of time is solely given by a theory’s dynamics. 
Oppositely, a non-structural arrow of time is not given by a theory’s dynamics, but it heavily 
depends on external properties or elements. 
3.2. Time asymmetry and Measurements –Penrose’s thought experiment 
Let us now take a closer look at the idea that MIC bases a quantum arrow of time. As I previously 
mentioned, Penrose put forward a simple thought experiment to illustrate it. 
Penrose starts by recognizing that OQM is in fact a time-symmetric theory but only regarding 
the part involving the Schrödinger equation –its unitary part (1989: 354). As for the other, its non-
unitary part given by MIC, the theory turns out to be time asymmetric. To see it, imagine the 
following setup. Suppose a lamp L at one extreme of the experimental arrangement, and a photo-
detector P at the opposite extreme. Between them, a half-silvered mirror M is placed, which is 
tilted at a 45° angle to the line from L to P. Suppose now that L randomly emits a photon, which 
is aimed at P to be detected. At L, some device registers with high reliability the number of photons 
emitted given a time interval. 
When a photon is emitted by L, the half-silvered mirror M can either reflects it or letting it to 
pass through. Thinking of the experiment in quantum-mechanical terms, Penrose suggests that 
when a single photon is emitted, the photon’s wave-function “impacts” the half-silvered mirror 
and splits in two parts: one part is reflected with an amplitude of √1/2  and the other passes 
through with the same amplitude. Until an observation is eventually made, both parts of the 




Through the statistical postulate of QM, we know that the probability that the photon reaches 
the photo-cell P is given by the square of the moduli of the amplitude, |√1/2|
2
= 1/2. Quantum 
mechanical calculations thus allow easily answering the following question: “Given that L 
registers, what is the probability that P registers?” OQM (as well as QM) implies that the 
probability is exactly ‘one-half’. And, after running the experiment many times, we will get 
(approximately) that probability distribution. We can also infer straightforwardly that if P didn’t 
register, then the photon hit the mirror and bounced off toward the laboratory wall (point A). 
It has been assumed though that time was running forward: the photon was firstly emitted by 
L, after a while reached the half-silvered mirror M, and then it split in two parts. At the (future) 
end of the experiment, the photon either reached the laboratory wall or was registered by the photo-
cell. For all practical purposes, OQM has predicted the results wonderfully well. But, in order to 
know if OQM is time symmetric, we have to consider if it yields the same results (that is, if it 
yields the same probability distribution) if time run backward. To find it out, Penrose claims we 
should rather begin with the following (time-reversed) question: “Given that P registers, what is 
the probability that L registers?” 
Penrose says: “we note that the correct experiment answer to this question is not ‘one-half’ at 
all, but ‘one’” (1989: 358), for if the photo-cell P indeed registers, then it is virtually certain that 
the photon was emitted (and thereby registered) by L. So, whenever P registers it logically follows 
that L also registered the 100% of times. This is not however what a time-reversed version of OQM 
retrodicts. It rather retrodicts that if we trace backward in time the photon’s wave-function that 
reached P, then it will have one-half of probability of reaching L, and one-half of being reflected 
and of hitting the laboratory wall at a point B (the opposite to A). In the light of this, Penrose claims 
that “in the case of our time-reversed question, the quantum-mechanical calculation has given us 
completely the wrong answer” (1989: 358. Italics in the original).  
The upshot of all this is that OQM does not gives us the same predictions/retrodictions in both 
directions of time. Hence, OQM implies an asymmetry between predictions and retrodictions. This 
asymmetry would be symptomatic of the fact that OQM treats the past-to-future direction and the 
future-to-past direction differently. Penrose puts it as following. “If we wish to calculate the 
probability of a past state on the basis of a known future state, we get quite the wrong answers if 
we try to adopt the standard R [MIC] procedure” (1989: 359). To put it simply, the class of models 
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that OQM generates are asymmetric with respect to the class of models that T(OQM) –the time-
reversed version of OQM– generates. Importantly, only those models generated by OQM turn out 
to be empirically adequate. And what does the job is the essential assumption that MIC is 
intrinsically time-reversal asymmetric. 
George Ellis (2013) has put forward a more general argument to show the time-asymmetric 
nature of MIC. Ellis’ rationale is mainly based on the fact the quantum states may collapse (when 
measured), but they never “uncollapse”. The process is intrinsically time-asymmetric to the extent 
to which the eigenstate |𝑞𝑘⟩ occurs after measuring (i.e. collapsing), that is, after the superposition. 
Furthermore, all coefficients in the superposition states we started with have been lost, so the 
knowledge of the final state says nothing about the initial state. To conclude, in Ellis’ words, “the 
process [MIC] is where the time irreversibility, and hence the arrow of time, is manifested at the 
quantum level” (2013: 243). 
Huw Price (1996) makes the same case in affirming that any measurement process would, 
under certain assumptions, introduce an “objective asymmetry in the structure of reality” (1996: 
207). Assuming OQM, the state of a quantum system in the period between two measurements 
reflects the nature of the former instead of the latter. Specifically, if an electron in a superposed 
state of the observable position is localized by means of a measurement device, then it will unitarily 
evolve according to the Schrödinger equation and its state will reflect the fact that the electron was 
measured and localized by a position-device. If we measure at a later time the electron’s 
momentum with a momentum-device, electron’s state will not reflect the nature of the second 
measurement (lying in its future) but that of former (lying in its past). 
When the situation between two measurements is time-reversed, the result is oddly the 
contrary. What we would then see, according to Price, is the electron’s state evolving toward a 
state associated with a measurement device in which it is to be involved in the future (1996: 206). 
OQM, and MIC consequently, typically takes for granted that a quantum system’s state depends 
upon its past state and its past interactions. The fact that things look so weird when running in the 
backward direction of time would indicate that a deep time-asymmetry lies at the core of MIC. 
To sum up. In introducing an additional dynamical postulate, OQM by the same maneuver 
introduces a time-asymmetric ingredient in the quantum theory. Such an asymmetry comes out 
from the very principles of the theory and it is built in its dynamics. So, we could on firm basis 
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hold that OQM allows defending a structural quantum arrow of time. In a nutshell, the thesis is 
that MIC turns out to be a non-time-reversal invariant law of the theory to the extent that  
• OQM does not provides the same probability predictions in both directions of time, and  
• quantum systems always collapse when measured but never “uncollapse”, according to 
MIC.  
To put it in the vocabulary of the Section 2.1, the structure of OQM’s solutions is asymmetric 
under time reversal since the set of its empirically adequate models is given by either  Ⱳ = Ⱳ𝑓 
or  Ⱳ = Ⱳ𝑏. In  Ⱳ𝑏 we should include evolutions giving us the wrong probability predictions and 
those quantum systems “uncollapsing” when temporally reversed. These are disregarded by the 
same MIC’s mechanism and by the quantum-mechanical statistic we expect to get. 
To see it clearly, let us take Penrose’s thought experiment again. Whereas the QM algorithm 
predicts in, say, the future direction of time that probability of registering a photon in P is one-half 
agreeing on what we observe, the time-reversed algorithm predicts that probability should also be 
one-half, when logically follows that it would rather be one. In this way, we are entitled to get rid 
of one set of solutions (those predicting a result that is a priori wrong). Consequently, what 
explains why OQM provides a structural arrow of time is that it turns out to be a predictive but not 
a retrodictive theory. And In virtue of this, it does treat the past-to-future direction and the future-
to-past direction differently It is worth emphasizing that this result is independent of whether the 
Schrödinger equation is time-reversal invariant or not. 
 
4. Arguments against a MIC-based arrow of time 
In this section, I will critically analyze a MIC-based arrow of time as well as some of the arguments 
against it. In the end, the conclusion will be that a MIC-based arrow of time might at best be local 
and non-structural. 
We can regard a MIC-based arrow of time as supported by two pillars: 
(a) MIC is genuinely a time asymmetric postulate. That it, MIC turns out time asymmetric 
under reliable time-reversal transformation. 
(b) MIC introduces a temporal asymmetry in the theory that yields a structural arrow of time 
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The proposal of a MIC-based arrow of time has been already criticized elsewhere. In particular, 
Craig Callender (2000) and Steven Savitt (1996) have claimed that the time-reversal operation 
upon which a MIC-based arrow of time relies is misconceived. So, they argue, under a more 
adequate time-reversal transformation, OQM comes out time symmetric, and thereby, any 
quantum arrow of time fades away. In the line of the above-mentioned pillars, there would be at 
least two strategies to puncture the MIC-based proposal: 
(a) To argument that MIC is not genuinely time asymmetric. 
(b) To claim that, though temporally asymmetric, MIC does not introduce a structural time 
asymmetry. 
Through the first strategy, it is argued that the way in which time has been reversed is 
misconceived. Hence, MIC, and thereby OQM, is not genuinely time asymmetric. This is the path 
followed by Callender and Savitt. Through the second, it is taken for granted that MIC is 
temporally asymmetric, but it is held that such an asymmetry is non-structural and local. 
4.1. OQM is not genuinely time asymmetric 
There are two senses in which Penrose’s thought experiment results a bit confusing in showing 
that MIC introduces a genuine and interesting time asymmetry. 
First of all, Penrose uses extra-quantum mechanical information when judging whether the 
theory is time symmetric2. In particular, in replying the forward-in-time answer “Given that L 
registers, what is the probability that P registers?” Penrose appeals to the usual quantum-
mechanical expectations. But, in considering the time-reversed answer “Given that P registers, 
what is the probability that L registers?” Penrose rather appeals to the non-quantum mechanical 
answer ‘one’ judged as “the correct experimental answer” (Penrose 1989: 358). This seems not to 
be a fair movement.  
To begin with, the experiment cannot be actually carried out in the backward direction of time, 
so we have to instead imagine what we would expect of so-settled experiment if the direction of 
time were reversed. But, in imagining such time-reversed scenario, Penrose leaks non-quantum 
mechanical information when judging what would be the right answer. Clearly, the (backward) 
 
2 Craig Callender (2000) has also mentioned an akin point, though he does not develop it. 
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quantum-mechanical answer is that one would obtain one-half of chances of getting the electron 
registered at L, which is equal to that obtained in the original direction of time (that is, through the 
forward-in-time-oriented OQM). But such a result would be quite shocking, and somehow anti-
intuitive for Penrose, because we already know that L always registers, so that the correct 
prediction would seem to be ‘one’ rather than ‘one-half’. But where does such a knowledge come 
from? It comes from running the experiment in the original direction of time and from extra-
quantum mechanical information extracted from how the experiment was settled in the future-
headed direction of time. Therefore, this asymmetry cannot be genuine or interesting since it is 
grounded in temporally biased knowledge. 
The second sense in which Penrose’s argument could be confusing relates to how time is being 
inverted in Penrose’s thought experiment. The notion of time reversal is generally applied to 
differential dynamical equations. So, we have a relatively sharp receipt of how differential 
dynamical equations should be temporally reversed3. But, now, we are dealing with a much 
worldlier situation involving photocells or lamps emitting photons. And we are left a bit clueless 
about what a time-reversed experimental setup would look like. 
What Penrose basically does in his thought experiment to reverse time is to imagine the same 
objects and the same situation but in the reverse order. Let us call Penrose’s time-reversal 
transformation 𝑇𝑃. So, given the (relevant) sequence where the photon is emitted by the lamp L, 
hits the half-silvered mirror M, passes through it and reaches the photo-cell P 
Future-headed sequence  𝐿 → 𝑀 → 𝑃 
𝑇𝑃 produces the (allegedly) time-reversed sequence 
Past-headed sequence  𝑇𝑃(𝐿 → 𝑀 → 𝑃) = 𝑃 → 𝑀 → 𝐿 
The question that the quantum-mechanical algorithm has to respond must be temporally reversed 
accordingly. By simply inverting the sequence as shown above, we have to also interchange the 
terms in the question, as Penrose indeed does: “Given that L registers, what is the probability that 
 
3 This claim should be tempered though. We have a relatively sharp recipe of how time reversal should be 
formally implemented in abstract, but when it comes to details or concrete instantiations, some problems 
come up even in such an abstract level. For discussion, see Sachs 1987, Albert 2000, Callender 2000, 
Roberts 2017, Lopez 2019). 
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P registers?” turns into the time-reversed question “Given that P registers, what is the probability 
that L registers?” 
It is clear in which sense OQM is time asymmetric if MIC and 𝑇𝑃 hold. However, it remains 
to be seen whether 𝑇𝑃 is a tenable time-reversal transformation. If it is not, then the time 
asymmetry in Penrose’s thought experiment may be put into question. Indeed, Penrose does not 
discuss any other alternative, but he uncritically assumes that an inversion of the direction of time 
amounts to simply inverting the state sequence and then to working out the corresponding 
probabilities (assuming extra-quantum mechanical information as was shown before). Yet, there 
are some other alternatives to take into account. For instance, Savitt defines at least three very 
broad notions of time reversal in the literature: (i) time-reversal1, which amounts to the mapping 
𝑇: 𝑡 → −𝑡; (ii) time-reversal2, which not only maps 𝑡 → −𝑡 but also temporally reverses the very 
states (and objects) of a sequence; and (iii) time-reversal3, which captures the essential idea that 
time reversal is motion reversal, and thereby, it must retrace the physical system’s trajectory.  
Interestingly, Penrose’s thought experiment is non-time-reversal invariant only under the first 
sense of time reversal but is time-reversal invariant in the second and third senses. In the same 
vein, Callender asks: “why compare 𝑃(𝑆𝑖 → 𝑆𝑓) with 𝑃 (𝑆𝑓 → 𝑆𝑖) and not with 𝑃 (𝑆𝑓
𝑇 → 𝑆𝑖
𝑇)?” 
(2000: 256). What Callender finds suspicious is that 𝑇𝑃 does not transform the states themselves 
but leaves them as they were in the direction of time we started with. So, Callender claims that is 
time-reversal invariance2 what actually amounts to reversing the direction of time properly, and 
not time-reversal invariance1, as Penrose presupposes. Hence, the genuine time-reversed sequence 
of Penrose’s thought experiment is not given by 𝑇𝑃 but by Callender’s time-reversal 
transformation, 𝑇𝐶: 
Past-headed sequence  𝑇𝐶(𝐿 → 𝑀 → 𝑃) = 𝑃𝑇 → 𝑀𝑇 → 𝐿𝑇 
where 𝑋𝑇 is a time-reversed state or object in the sequence. Callender gives some hints about how 
this should be interpreted. He says: “if Penrose is genuinely concerned with TRI [time-reversal 
invariance], he should treat the emitter as a receiver and vice versa” (2000: 256. Emphasis added). 
Therefore, the right time-reversed question to make to the quantum-mechanical algorithm is not 
“what is the probability that L registers, given that P registers”, but “what is the probability that a 
time-reversed L registers, given that a time-reversed P registers”. Penrose would thus be 
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addressing his own thought experiment from the wrong angle when time reversed. And when 
addressed rightly, time-symmetry (in particular, 𝑇𝐶-symmetry) is restored. 
Let me add some comments on this. It is true that 𝑇𝑃 is not the only conceivable time-reversal 
transformation. Furthermore, it might be not the most adequate implementation of time reversal. 
Callender and Savitt are right at pointing to this, compelling any defender of Penrose’s argument 
to provide some support for 𝑇𝑃. That is fair and further justification should be given. However, I 
disagree on Callender’s conclusion that 𝑇𝐶 be the right implementation of time reversal for 
Penrose’s thought experiment. I think his argument is flawed in two ways. First, it does not offer 
a more reliable way to time reverse Penrose’s thought experiment. Instead of that, it leads to 
destroy the very objects involved in the thought experiment. Second, it begs the question if used 
to claim that time symmetry holds. These issues follow from two possible readings of Callender’s 
proposal of time reversal, particularly, of how the states in the series must be temporally reversed. 
Let us suppose that 𝑇𝐶 is the right way to temporally reverse Penrose’s thought experiment. 
As Callender suggests, it implies that one should treat the emitter as receiver and vice versa. 
Callender does not add much to this but let us to parse it out. To begin, 𝑇𝐶 implies that, 
 
𝑇𝐶(𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑟) = 𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑟 (2) 
It means that a time-reversed photocell should be treated as an emitter. Thus, the time-reversed 
sequence  
 
𝑇𝐶(𝐿 → 𝑀 → 𝑃) = 𝑃𝑇 → 𝑀𝑇 → 𝐿𝑇 (3) 
should be instead read saying that a time-reversed photocell emits a photon at 𝑡2 and shortly after 
the time-reversed photon hits the time-reversed mirror, always with t decreasing. Through the 
quantum-mechanical algorithm, we know that it has one-half chances of passing through the half-
silvered mirrored and of reaching the time-reversed lamp, and one-half of being headed to the 
laboratory wall. As it was mentioned previously, if Penrose’s though experiment is so time 
reversed, then it comes out time-reversal invariant as it delivers the same probabilities for t 
increasing and t decreasing. 
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At this point, the following question can be raised: how would a time-reversed photo-cell 
work? We know how photocells works in the ordinary direction of time, but we have no clue about 
how a time-reversed photocell would work. Treating the photocell as an emitter doesn’t help so 
much for a photocell is not the sort of thing that emits anything. Why are we entitled to suppose 
that a photocell will behave in a completely different way, capable of emitting electrons and 
behaving as an emitter when temporally reversed?  
It can be argued that ordinary photocells do not emit anything, but time-reversed photocells do 
it. In reply to this, it can be said that in fact a time-reversed something is obtained, but it does not 
deserve the name of ‘photo-cell’. And this is so because it simply does not work like a photocell. 
It seems, hence, that by 𝑇𝐶 reversing the direction of time the very objects (or states) involved in 
the sequence are destroyed. Photocells, if we wish to use the word meaningfully, cannot be the 
sort of thing that emits anything in either direction of time in so far as we are still dealing with 
photocells in some relevant sense.  
Let me put the point slightly differently. Photocells may come in various types and instantiate 
different properties, so we can imagine different modal scenarios for photocells, altering their 
properties and their conditions. Notwithstanding, if we wish to still refer to photo-cells properly, a 
certain sub-group of properties must remain fixed and some other properties must be necessarily 
excluded.  Otherwise, we would be unable to identify the objects at issue through different 
scenarios. My claim is that the property of “functioning like a photo-cell” (that is, the more general 
property of “behaving as a receiver”) must remain fixed. Conversely, the property of “behaving 
like an emitter” must be excluded. All this in order to identify photocells thought different 
scenarios and to keep talking about photocells meaningfully.  
I do not see any reason why this should be different in a time-reversed scenario. A time-
reversed photocell in a past-headed experimental running should emit nothing to the same extent 
that a photocell emits nothing in a future-headed experimental running. Otherwise, Otherwise, we 
are referring to a different object, no longer a photocell. But, in fact, it would be strange that the 
very functional nature of the objects changes so radically when time is reversed –I see no time-
dependent feature in the functional nature of a photo-cell that required a change if time were 
reversed. Quite the opposite, if object’s inner nature can freely vary when time reversed, then time-
reversal invariance will practically always follow trivially. 
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And this is how the second reading of the argument comes into play: we should make explicit 
how a photocell transforms into a different sort of object under time reversal. I think that the only 
possible choice is to suppose that 
 
𝑇𝐶(𝑃) = 𝐿 (4) 
That is, a time-reversed photocell should be treated as if it were a lamp. Analogously, 
 
𝑇𝐶(𝐿) = 𝑃 (5) 
Now it seems we are getting somewhere for a lamp is in fact the sort of thing that is able to 
behave like an emitter. This could be reworded as following: when an experiment is 𝑇𝐶-reversed, 
the time-reversed photocell is capable of emitting because it is, in the opposite direction of time, a 
lamp. This reading, however, is patently question-begging. What is at issue is to test whether time 
symmetry holds, but if time symmetry can transform the objects (and their state) at will, then it 
seems that the transformation is designed to leave the experimental setup virtually unaltered. So, 
both situations are bound to be time-reversal symmetric because the transformation does nothing 
if a time-reversed photo-cell behaves like a lamp, and a time-reversed lamp behaves like a photo-
cell: we are simply swapping names and keeping the same physical situation unaltered. 
To put it more drastically: we are simply marking the states with a “T”. And it is blatant that a 
graphical mark will not produce any physical change! The problem with this implementation is 
that implicitly assumes that a change in the direction of time is, so to speak, innocuous in the 
description of any physical situation. It just plays the role of re-parametrizing the time coordinate, 
of swapping names and of leaving the experimental setup as unaltered as possible. This is not per 
se a wrong-headed implementation of time reversal. But I do not see how a substantive 
philosophical claim may come out from it. After all, we are dealing with a transformation that will 
surely produce time symmetric scenarios. 
To sum up. Many of these criticisms are on the right track in pointing that Penrose’s time-
reversal transformation requires further justification. They are also on the right track in pointing 
to the fact that there are other candidates that might do the job. Remarkably, Penrose’s time 
asymmetric experiment may come out time symmetric under a different implementation of time 
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reversal. However, I think we should be cautious since the other candidates also run into troubles 
when implemented. So, at this point, I believe the best we can do is to affirm that whether the time 
asymmetry of Penrose’s though experiment is interesting or genuine largely depends upon the time 
reversal implementation. I do not have a good answer for it. To a good extent, I think that the 
implementation of time reversal hinges crucially upon previously assumed philosophical 
commitments that have to be unpacked case by case. In some sense, given the right philosophical 
framework, any time-reversal transformation might be defendable. 
Given this scenario, a noteworthy path is the following. Let us assume that OQM is time 
asymmetric as Penrose argues it is. Instead of questioning that, let us look into the qualification of 
such a claim. What sort of time asymmetry, and arrow of time, does OQM deliver? 
4.2. A MIC-based arrow of time: local and non-structural. 
Let’s tackle Penrose’s argument from a different angle. Remember that the statistical postulate of 
the theory assumes that if a measurement of the observable 𝐴 is carried out, it will produce, with 
a certain probability, one of its eigenvalues 𝑎𝑖 as a result. So, if a system is in the state |𝜓⟩ =
∑ 𝑎𝑖|𝑎𝑖⟩, then the probability that the eigenvalue 𝑎𝑖 of 𝐴 is found when measured is equal to 𝑃(𝐴 =
𝑎𝑖, |𝜓⟩) = |𝑎𝑖|
2. In its logical form, the algorithm says 
FORWARD  𝑃(𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒 𝑎𝑡 𝑡2 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑎𝑖 𝑜𝑓 𝑜𝑏𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝐴, |𝜓⟩ 𝑎𝑡 𝑡1) = 𝑝 
Borrowing Albert’s words, the crucial question here is whether this algorithm (giving us the 
conditional probabilities of some later state given an earlier state) when formulated backward 
works equally well as FORWARD 
BACKWARD 𝑃(𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒 𝑎𝑡 𝑡0 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑎𝑖 𝑜𝑓 𝑜𝑏𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝐴, |𝜓⟩ 𝑎𝑡 𝑡1) = 𝑝 
It is a fact that OQM does not give us the probability of earlier states given later states for the 
theory is predictive, but not retrodictive (see Callender 2000: 258). Something like this was 
probably in Penrose’s mind in drawing his thought experiment up. If this is the case, he was right 
all along in regarding OQM as a time asymmetric theory since the theory is not indeed retrodictive. 
And this fact is independent of the time-reversal transformation we employ. Satosi Watanabe has 
also subscribed this conclusion in claiming that “it is precisely irretrodictability what is related to 
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phenomenal one-wayness” (1965: 56)4. Hence, MIC inevitably breaks the time-reversal symmetry 
of the unitary part of the theory since it yields results directly in terms of conditional probabilities 
for states in the future, but not in the past5. 
The point I want to make here is that even though MIC introduces a time asymmetry in the 
theory, it falls short in grounding a global, structural arrow of time. I will put forward two 
arguments. I will show that MIC can be only defined locally since it cannot be applied to the 
universe as a whole. In consequence, any arrow of time it yields will be local. Second, I will argue 
that any MIC-based arrow of time necessarily relies upon extrinsic properties of the dynamics for 
the time asymmetry to make sense. 
Let’s start with the first argument. As many times repeated, OQM assigns a fundamental role 
to measurements, and thereby, to the sort of measurement performed –as von Neumann said, the 
quantum theory is about the measured system plus the measuring apparatus. It follows from this 
that any temporal MIC-based asymmetry makes sense only if an external measurement device can 
be suitably defined, which requires the system to be open. So, any definition of MIC and the 
resultant arrow of time makes sense only if the system interacts with an external apparatus. 
However, this is not possible if we take the quantum state of the universe as a whole –by definition, 
the universe is a closed system, so it is not possible to suitably define a measurement device out 
of the universe. But if the experimental situation cannot be defined, neither can MIC. Therefore, 
any MIC-based arrow of time will necessarily be local as well. 
We can take a step further. It could be argued that in OQM the wave-function of the entire 
universe6 never collapses but always evolves unitarily according to some universal Schrödinger-
 
4 Even though it’s true that in general time asymmetry (or non-time-reversal invariance) and 
“irretrodictability” may come to be thought as two quite different properties, and one could consequently 
argue that no temporal directionality should be followed from irretrodictability, it has been argued that in 
some cases, like non-relativistic quantum mechanics, the implication is right. Earman for instance claims 
that in any statistical theory non-time-reversal invariance directly follows from irretrodictability in the sense 
of BACKWARD (Earman 1974). 
5 We could think that by adding BACKWARD to the theory the problem vanishes. Richard Healey has 
showed that this cannot be done without trivializing the theory, if it is statistical. For further details and 
discussion about it, see Healey (1981: 103-108). 
6 It could be argued that the notion of a ‘universal wave-function’ makes no sense within OQM. It may be 
true. Nonetheless, it just imposes a more radical constraint over OQM, ruling out any global time 
asymmetry from the very outset. Thanks to Carl Hoefer for pointing this out. 
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type equation. In a nutshell, nothing can interrupt the unitary, linear and deterministic evolution of 
the universal wave function, if a measurement cannot be carried out. But, under the usual 
assumption that the Schrödinger equation is time-reversal symmetric, all this entails that the 
universe as a whole does not exhibit any arrow of time. And this scenario delivers a shattered 
picture of reality, as that presented in Section 2.1. On the one hand, there is a time symmetric 
universal quantum state. On the other, time asymmetric local quantum states within measurement 
contexts. This scenario, though coherent, is a bit puzzling. Yet, it emphasizes that OQM renders 
at best a local arrow of time. 
The second argument concerns MIC itself. The point I want to make is that the transition 
“uncollapsed states” → “collapsed states” remains vague and undefined as long as the measuring 
device is not exhaustively specified. Therefore, any MIC-based arrow of time heavily relies upon 
our epistemic access to the information about a measurement context. It implies that any MIC-
based arrow of time can be hardly regarded as structural since it does not strictly depend solely on 
intrinsic properties of OQM’s dynamics, but also on the information we have about external factors 
intervening upon the dynamics.  
The slogan of the proposal is to claim that the non-unitary transition caused by MIC would 
allow defining a direction of time because the transition always goes from “uncollapsed/undefined 
states” to “collapsed/defined states”. As it stands, however, this is not quite accurate in so much 
as the theory also describes the transition from “collapsed/defined states” to “uncollapsed/defined 
states” –for instance, when a quantum system is prepared in a different basis. To rephrase it, the 
above-mentioned transition is true only if the quantum state is collapsed onto the a previously fixed 
basis. Yet, we can only come to know that if we previously have information about the measuring 
device.  
Suppose that |𝑎1⟩, |𝑎2⟩ are the eigenstates of the observable A. Suppose also we design an A-
device, which measures the observable A. We know that when measuring the observable A through 
an A-device, the quantum state will collapse onto either of its eigenstates. However, we also know 
by the bare QM that it is possible to write down the eigenstates of A in a different basis, say, B 
with which A does not commute. Hence, we can rewrite each eigenstate |𝑎1⟩ as a superposition of 
B’s eigenstates, |𝑎1⟩ = |𝑏1⟩ + |𝑏2⟩, and the eigenstate |𝑏1⟩ as |𝑏1⟩ = |𝑎1⟩ + |𝑎2⟩. And the same 
goes, mutatis mutandis, for |𝑎2⟩ and |𝑏2⟩. 
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The idea is that, without any further specification about the experimental setup will be run, the 
“uncollapsed state” → “collapsed state” transition 
 
|𝑏1⟩ =  |𝑎1⟩ + |𝑎2⟩ →  |𝑎2 (6) 
Can be rightfully viewed as the “collapsed state” → “uncollapsed state” transition 
 
|𝑏1⟩ →  |𝑏1⟩ + |𝑏2⟩ (7) 
where |𝑎2⟩ = |𝑏1⟩ + |𝑏2⟩. The system will then “uncollapse”, so to speak, when measured. This is 
the case, for instance, when the initial state is prepared before running an experiment in a given 
basis. 
In this light, the asymmetric transition “uncollapsed state” → “collapsed state” can be 
univocally fixed only in relation to a previously detailed experimental situation. It follows that the 
transition is not intrinsically asymmetric (that is, it does not depend exclusively on intrinsic 
properties of its dynamics), but depends on the information we have about the sort of experiment 
to be run, which defines the basis in which the state is to be written down. Once this information 
is available, it is true that system will never uncollapse in that measurement context and that basis. 
But, if the eigenstates of the system are expressed in a different basis, and the experiment’s 
configuration is modified, the system may undergo a “collapsed state” → “collapsed state” 
transition. Consequently, MIC itself, and any philosophically substantive claim we can extract 
from it, remains undefined without specifying the measurement context adequately. 
From these reasons, it is not clear to me that MIC provides us the grounds for a structural, or 
even an objective, arrow of time in OQM. Let me make the case in more epistemic terms. Suppose 
that the any information available to us is that a quantum state in a superposition of |𝑎1⟩ + |𝑎2⟩ 
was measured by an unspecified measurement device (it could have been either a A-device or a B-
device). Someone told us that the outcome was ‘𝑎2’ meaning that the quantum state may have 
collapsed into eigenstate |𝑎2⟩. The MIC-based arrow of time proposal will say that |𝑎1⟩ + |𝑎2⟩ 
came earlier because is an uncollapsed state, whereas |𝑎2⟩ came later, after the measurement, 
because it is a collapsed state.  
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Nevertheless, we could know nothing about the measurement context, whether the 
measurement device was an A-device or a B-device. If it was an A-device, then it is possible to 
claim that the state collapsed into the eigenstate |𝑎2⟩. And this in fact displays the right sort of 
temporal asymmetry we were after. But if we do not know it, we may rewrite the states in a B-
basis, and then obtain an “uncollapsing” scenario. Naturally, if we know we are dealing with a B-
device, it would be highly confusing to write the state down in a different basis. But this is exactly 
the point: all depends on what is the information available to us. In an ignorance situation, we 
could express the state in either of the bases and there would be no matter of fact to assert that 
what was obtained was either an “uncollapsed state” → “collapsed state” or a “collapsed state” → 
“uncollapsed state” transition. When the information about the measuring device becomes 
available, it is relatively easy to decide whether a collapsing or an uncollapsing scenario took place. 
But, in accepting this, any attempt to ground a structural MIC-based arrow of time rapidly vanishes 
since it would be relative to the (arbitrary) choice of a measurement device. And it is not obvious 
at all how this choice could be related to an asymmetry of time structurally. 
5. Concluding Remarks 
In this paper, I have critically analyzed a widely accepted proposal claiming that MIC lays the 
groundwork for an objective, structural arrow of time in OQM. After introducing the proposal in 
some detail, in Section 3.1 I have discussed some of criticisms it received, in particular, those 
considering that some of defenses of a MIC-based arrow of time employ a wrongheaded notion of 
time reversal. In Section 3.2, I have assumed that, despite those criticisms, there is a relevant sense 
in which MIC produces a time-reversal asymmetry within OQM. Nonetheless, I have argued that 
such an asymmetry is much more constrained than usually thought. In accordance to this, I have 
shown that any MIC-based arrow of time can only be local and non-structural for, first, it cannot 
be suitably defined for the entire universe, and second, it crucially depends on external information 
about the measuring device. 
As it was pointed out in the introduction, MIC is just one of the members of collapse theory 
families. Despite being almost the orthodoxy within the physicists’ community, OQM has lately 
been rather delegated among philosophers of physics. Much attention has been instead drawn 
towards different collapse models within the DRP, where collapses produce spontaneously and 
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independently of measurements. Furthermore, it has been argued (see, for instance, Albert 2000 
and Esfeld and Sachse 2007) that DRP (and in particular, GRW) does in fact provide the grounds 
for an objective and intrinsic arrow of time. The analysis of the relationship between DRP and a 
collapse-based arrow of time is left for future research. 
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